Products · Product
Boeing 737 MAX
Raised as a usability problem by 77 people on Hacker News over 10 years (2017–2026), in 72 threads.
No issue was raised by at least 3 people in 3 threads this year.
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Every issue, all time, most people first
Pilots didn't know how to counter runaway trim and override itUnreviewed
20172026- Pilots did not remember the procedure for runaway stabilizer trim2024-01-12
- Pilots couldn't tell the automated system caused unexpected trim changes; no warning, cause omitted from manual2022-12-04
- Standard runaway trim procedure fails; pilots must use electric trim first, which is counterintuitive2022-02-07
Pilots lacked a separate way to disable MCAS besides trim switchesUnreviewed
20172026- Cutout switches did not isolate MCAS, and this was not clearly communicated to pilots2024-07-11
- Pilots cannot isolate MCAS trim, so electric trim switches are their only way to retrim quickly enough2024-03-25
- Pilots lacked a separate way to disable MCAS apart from electric trim switches2023-12-12
Pilots not warned of conflicting sensor data or trained on the systemUnreviewed
20172026- Pilots not warned of conflicting sensor data and not trained on the system2025-08-27
- Pilots lacked training and alarms, so they could not tell the system was pushing the nose down2019-10-14
- Faulty AoA sensor gives pilots unreliable airspeed data, so they can't tell what the aircraft is doing2019-06-25
Pilots handed control while confused, with no explanation of automationUnreviewed
20172026- Pilots weren't told about undocumented system behavior, so couldn't operate it correctly2021-03-07
- Pilots could not take the corrective actions needed to counter the system2019-09-27
- Software behaves counter-intuitively for pilots, who may not expect its actions2019-03-13
Key safety indicators were an optional extra, so pilots lacked informationUnreviewed
20172026- Multiple simultaneous alerts caused pilot distraction and confusion, making the situation hard to interpret2024-01-10
- Cockpit warnings were highly confusing and overwhelming for pilots to interpret2020-08-04
- Safety indicators were an optional extra, so pilots lacked key information2019-10-14
Unreviewed issues were grouped by machine: Claude Haiku labelled each comment as a usability complaint, named what it's about and summed up the problem in a line, and a small model grouped similar problems. Nobody has checked them by hand. Expect mistakes.
The newest 50 complaints
- Pilots lack physical feedback that other planes give, so stalls go unnoticed.2026-05-25
- Pilots not warned of conflicting sensor data and not trained on the system2025-08-27
- Cutout switches did not isolate MCAS, and this was not clearly communicated to pilots2024-07-11
- Pilots cannot isolate MCAS trim, so electric trim switches are their only way to retrim quickly enough2024-03-25
- Pilots did not remember the procedure for runaway stabilizer trim2024-01-12
- Multiple simultaneous alerts caused pilot distraction and confusion, making the situation hard to interpret2024-01-10
- Clicking the placeholder text doesn't focus the input box, so users aren't prompted to type2024-01-09
- Clicking the placeholder text does nothing, so the user thinks the box is broken2024-01-09
- Pilots must remember to manually turn the deicing heater back on later2024-01-05
- Pilots lacked a separate way to disable MCAS apart from electric trim switches2023-12-12
- Checklist doesn't cover MCAS's intermittent fault, so pilots are told not to use it2023-09-04
- Pilots can't tell MCAS malfunction from runaway trim; it seems to resolve, then returns2023-09-04
- Pilots confused because MCAS activated briefly every minute, so they didn't know to act2023-04-18
- Pilots can't tell MCAS exists or why trim is misbehaving, and cutoff removes manual trim2023-04-04
- Pilots cannot recognize MCAS activity, which looks like a typical runaway stabilizer failure2022-12-25
- Pilots couldn't tell the automated system caused unexpected trim changes; no warning, cause omitted from manual2022-12-04
- Pilots had only about 10 seconds to disable MCAS before crash was inevitable2022-04-28
- Standard runaway trim procedure fails; pilots must use electric trim first, which is counterintuitive2022-02-07
- Pilots must act within seconds on an MCAS failure, and the required response is not intuitive2021-10-15
- Pilots could not trim the aircraft, and disabling the runaway trim needed a complicated manual checklist2021-04-01
- Pilots weren't told about undocumented system behavior, so couldn't operate it correctly2021-03-07
- Pilots cannot feel each other's control inputs; stall warning shuts off in severe stalls2020-11-10
- Commenter says the 737 MAX control software has bad UI/UX2020-11-10
- Pilots could not manually move the trim wheel after cutoff switches, and cutoff switches reactivated MCAS2020-08-04
- Cockpit warnings were highly confusing and overwhelming for pilots to interpret2020-08-04
- Disabling MCAS can leave trim mechanically impossible to reset without electric trim2020-02-06
- No clear way for pilots to turn off the system when failing2020-02-06
- Pilots failed to notice the autothrottle warning and falling airspeed, instead of disconnecting2020-01-21
- Pilots not told MCAS exists, gives no clear indication it's running, and can only be disabled by losing electric trim2020-01-13
- Pilots' trim inputs are overridden by MCAS, so the runaway trim procedure cannot be followed as trained2019-12-24
- Cutoff switches cut all electric trim, so pilots cannot isolate MCAS while keeping pilot trim2019-11-16
- Pilots couldn't identify the MCAS problem, and the official recovery procedure didn't work2019-10-23
- Pilots lacked training and alarms, so they could not tell the system was pushing the nose down2019-10-14
- Safety indicators were an optional extra, so pilots lacked key information2019-10-14
- Pilots did not know trim re-trim resets MCAS activation cycle and increments trim amount2019-09-28
- Pilots couldn't tell MCAS existed, had activated, what it was doing, or how to disable it2019-09-27
- Pilots could not take the corrective actions needed to counter the system2019-09-27
- Manual trim wheel is very hard to rotate in some flight regimes2019-09-27
- Pilots struggle to recover from out-of-trim condition after cutout switches disable electric trim2019-07-06
- Faulty AoA sensor gives pilots unreliable airspeed data, so they can't tell what the aircraft is doing2019-06-25
- Cutout switches also disable yoke trim control on MAX, unlike NG, surprising pilots2019-05-29
- Pilots not told that pulling the yoke wouldn't stop the automatic trim2019-05-29
- The controls to disable MCAS were weird and confusing for pilots to use2019-05-20
- Switches changed so pilots lose fine control and can't tell MCAS is still trimming the stabilizer2019-05-11
- Warning light was not clearly explained, so pilots did not know it was a paid optional feature2019-05-06
- Pilots could not manually re-trim the aircraft with the trim wheels against aerodynamic forces2019-05-06
- Warning light gives no clear sign when the stall warning is silenced2019-05-06
- Failure case requires unintuitive remediation; pressing the cutout button does nothing in some cases2019-05-03
- Pilots struggled to identify and react to erratic MCAS trim activity they were unaware of2019-04-19
- Pilots lack a clear, documented way to disable MCAS when it misbehaves2019-04-16